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The Binding Problem Review
Introduction
binding neural signals across cortical space, binding
occurs in other modalities. For instance, auditory bind-
ing may be needed to discriminate the sound of a single
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voice in a crowd; binding across time is required for
interpreting object motion; and cross-modal binding is
Since its original formulation as a theoretical problem required to associate the sound of a ball striking a bat
(von der Malsburg, 1981), ªthe binding problemº has with the visual percept of it, so that both are effortlessly
captured the attention of researchers across many disci- perceived as being aspects of a single event. I like to
plines, including psychology, neuroscience, computa- refer to these sorts of problems as perceptual binding
tional modeling, and even philosophy. Despite the is- problems, since they involve unifying aspects of per-
sue's prominence in these fields, what ªbindingº means cepts. In addition, there are cognitive binding problems:
is rarely made explicit. In this paper, I will briefly survey they include relating a concept to a percept, such as
the many notions of binding and will introduce some linking the visual representation of an apple to all the
issues that will be explored more fully in the reviews semantic knowledge stored about it (it is edible, how it
that follow. tastes, used in pies, etc.); cross-modal identification,
such as being able to identify an item that has previously
What Is Binding? only been seen by how it feels; and memory reconstruc-
The canonical example of binding is the one suggested tion, the linking of previously encoded information to
by Rosenblatt (1961; see also von der Malsburg, 1999 form a structured and unified representation. While this
[this issue of Neuron]), in which one sort of visual feature, perceptual/cognitive distinction is somewhat artificial,
such as an object's shape, must be correctly associated it serves to highlight the fact that binding occurs in many
with another feature, such as its location, to provide a different kinds of brain processes. The reviews that fol-
unified representation of that object. Such explicit asso- low tend to focus on the visual binding problem, al-
ciation, or ªbinding,º becomes especially important though not exclusively. It behooves us to be as explicit
when more than one visual object is present, in order as possible about the nature of the particular problem
to avoid incorrect combinations of features belonging under investigation, for while it is likely that most differ-
to different objects, otherwise known as ªillusory con- ent forms of binding problems are solved via common
junctionsº (Triesman and Schmidt, 1982). Considerable mechanisms, that is only a parsimonious assumption,
psychological evidence exists for the occurrence of illu- and ultimately it is an empirical issue.
sory conjunctions (see Wolfe and Cave, 1999 [this is- On the other side of the coin, it is worthwhile to re-
sue]), suggesting that in certain cases, binding is indeed member that something as complex as binding, writ
a problem for the brain. In addition, evidence from neu- large, may not have a single mechanistic solution. The
roanatomy and neurophysiology indicates that pro- potential mechanisms for binding suggested in these
cessing streams in the visual system are segregated, so reviews are not mutually exclusive: there is ample room
that feature dimensions such as color, motion, location, for attentional, temporal, and combinatorial coding mech-
and object identity are processed in separate brain re- anisms to work together in the brain to process informa-
gions. It should be noted, however, that while earlier tion, and there may well be other as yet undiscovered
characterizations of anatomical processing streams em- mechanisms at work as well.
phasized their segregation, more recent studies increas-
ingly show a large degree of cross-talk between brain Is Binding a Problem?
regions and more evidence for sensitivity to dimensions There are two types of indications that binding is a prob-
other than the preferred one for many brain regions (see lem. The first is an indication that the brain has difficulty
Ghose and Maunsell, 1999 [this issue]). Thus, although in binding. This can occur in normal brains when there
neuroanatomical information will be central to under- are temporal or capacity limitations, which lead to errors
standing how the brain processes stimuli and forms such as illusory conjunctions (see Wolfe and Cave, 1999;
representations, our current knowledge of neuroanat- Treisman, 1999 [this issue]). It can also occur in dam-
omy is sufficient to constrain neither the problem of aged brains, when deficits appear that make it clear that
binding nor its solution. binding is critical for normal cognitive operation. For
example, in Balint's syndrome, bilateral parietal damage
Binding Problems, Binding Solutions causes simultagnosia, the inability to perceive more
The singular term ªproblemº suggests that binding is a than one object at a time. Other experiments show unex-
unitary problem. In fact, the binding problem is a class pected dissociations between pathways. For instance,
of problems, and some of the confusion in discussions of Goodale et al. (1991, 1994) report evidence for a double
binding may stem from the fact that different phenomena dissociation between a vision-for-perception and a vi-
are being referred to by a single name. Besides visual sion-for-action pathway: patients with lesions restricted
binding, which includes binding information across visual to occipitoparietal cortex can discriminate objects ac-
space, binding information across types of features, and cording to shape, but cannot properly grasp them in
accordance with the visual percept, while others with
lesions in ventral cortex fail at the discrimination task,* E-mail: aroskies@cell.com.
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but can respond perfectly well to that stimulus with an model that stands as a plausibility proof for combinato-
appropriate grasping action (Goodale et al., 1991, 1994). rial coding being sufficient for object recognition. Their
In this case, it is not entirely clear whether binding nor- model uses a moderate number of broadly tuned neu-
mally takes place between these pathways, but the fact rons to perform an object recognition task, and it is
that similar dissociations are not seen in undamaged successful even in the presence of other objects. Al-
brains suggests that information is shared between though their model is consistent with neurophysiological
pathways, and this may be accomplished through bind- data, it remains to be seen whether an extended model
ing. Thus, both experiments and case studies reveal could deal with the diversity of stimuli and complexity
that the brain does engage in some operations responsi- of tasks that brains handle easily every day. In addition,
ble for appropriately combining neural signals. the model's metric for object recognition is that a tuned
The second indication that binding is a problem is a unit responds more to the object it is tuned for than to
conceptual one: even if the brain usually does not ap- distractors. It will be interesting to see how robust the
pear to have a problem in correctly binding signals, we performance is when the number of units and the num-
as scientists still lack an understanding of how informa- ber of distractors grows.
tion variously distributed in patterns of neural firing re- Von der Malsburg (1999), in his review, makes two
sults in coherent representations. Thus, binding is a particularly important points that add perspective to the
problem in that it requires an explanation. discussion. The first is that the flexibility of brain function
sets it apart from network models, and the second is
Mechanisms of Binding that learning or plasticity must be a fundamental compo-
Several of the papers in this issue of Neuron treat, in nent of whatever the mechanisms are that bind neural
detail, possible mechanisms of binding. Reynolds and signals. While the goal of a model is often to simulate
Desimone (1999) explain how attentional mechanisms a single task that the brain can perform, the ªgoalº of the
could be indispensible for binding, and indeed much brain is to be able to handle whatever complex stimuli or
evidence from psychology and neurology suggests that situations it might encounter. Rosenblatt's (1961) solu-
attention and binding are intimately related (Wolfe and tion to the binding problem demonstrates that solving
Cave, 1999). Both Gray (1999) and Singer (1999b) dis- any given problem is often rather straightforward, and
cuss how temporal synchrony (or temporal correlation) complex mechanisms such as temporal binding can ap-
could be used to bind neural signals and describe the pear to be unnecessary. However, difficulties such as
evidence for and against temporal binding. They bring to combinatorial explosions (but see Ghose and Maunsell,
the fore an impressive amount of evidence from diverse 1999 [this issue]) and ontogenetic factors arise when
neuroscientific approaches, and provide a perspective on trying to model a more general-purpose device, and the
temporal aspects of neural coding from the cellular to necessity of binding becomes apparent. How general
the systems levels. From the data presented, I think it is Riesenhuber and Poggio's model? Can it also be the
is clear that neural oscillations and synchronous signals framework for other visual tasks besides recognition?
are present in the brain and that neurons have the ma- How flexible is this type of network? Until issues of
chinery to exploit these signals (for instance, in changing scaling and task specificity are more thoroughly ex-
synaptic strengths). However, there is only suggestive plored, it is difficult to say how applicable such a model
but not yet incontrovertible evidence that these signals may be for understanding brain function.
are used for binding, or that they play any critical role
in brain function. These proponents of temporal correla-
Is Binding Enough?tion are extremely measured in their discussion, and are
Both Ghose and Maunsell and Shadlen and Movshoncareful to emphasize that available evidence is consis-
point out what is perhaps the fundamental problem withtent with, but does not prove, that temporal correlation
the binding hypothesis: even supposing that temporalis used for binding. In the other camp, Shadlen and
coding is the vehicle for signaling which neural popula-Movshon (1999) offer an incisive critique of the temporal
tions should be bound together, the theory does notbinding hypothesis, arguing that temporal signals do
adequately address how those combinations are com-not have the capability of encoding binding relations.
puted. In a sense, the binding problem is pushed backSeveral of the reviews suggest experiments that could
one level, for it must be solved at least partially for thehelp cement or destroy the case for temporal synchrony
necessary temporal correlations to be established. Arein perceptual binding, although executing these experi-
neurons with appropriate receptive field properties andments properly will be a great challenge.
anatomical connectivity a sufficient basis for the genera-Ghose and Maunsell (1999) and Riesenhuber and Pog-
tion of correlated signals? What is the role of top-downgio (1999a), in contrast to the others, argue that there is
connections in establishing proper synchrony? Thesereally no binding problem, in the sense that the classical
questions are difficult to answer and difficult to modelhierarchical scheme of neural coding, going back to
with biological realism. A similar problem rests with theHubel and Weisel, can encode the combinatorial infor-
output side of the temporal binding hypothesisÐif corre-mation required for perception without leading to a com-
lations are the signal for binding, how are those signalsbinatorial explosion. While Ghose and Maunsell claim
read out? The readout problem is one of the most puz-that specialized groups of cells are at least as powerful
zling and fundamental problems for systems neurosci-as temporal correlations could be for supporting rich
ence in general: how is the firing of populations of neu-representations, they nonetheless suggest that an ex-
rons interpreted and transformed by other neurons toplanation for unitary representations is lacking and that
result in decision, action, perception, etc? This problemsome form of binding must exist. Riesenhuber and Pog-
gio do not address this larger issue, but they outline a plagues most, if not all, models of brain function, for in
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modeling it is the modeler that attributes semantics to
nodes in a network. One way to potentially avoid that
problem would be to close the loop between the model
and the world, so that the world impinges upon the
network, which then acts upon and affects the world,
thus generating semantics through action.
This brings me to mention (by virtue of my editorial
license) what is perhaps the most mystifying binding
problem of all: the problem of consciousness. How does
something as simple and mechanistic as neural firing
add up to subjectivity, raw feelings, a self? Are the mech-
anisms that allow us to attribute the correct color and
shape to an object the same ones that lead to the unity of
phenomenal experience? Will the solution of the binding
problem be the solution to the mystery of conscious-
ness? I will not belabor the point, since answers will be
long in coming, but although none of the scientists who
authored the reviews that follow discuss binding with
respect to consciousness, I will wager that the a good
part of the interest, excitement, and contentiousness
that surrounds the binding debate is attributable to the
magnitude of the issues with which it is connected. The
following pieces provide a comprehensive review of the
status of the binding problem at the dawn of the new
millenium. It will be extremely interesting to repeat this
exercise in a decade or two, to chart the progress that
we as scientists make on one of the most puzzling and
fascinating issues that the brain and cognitive sciences
have ever faced.
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